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Abstract
  Active interrogation, a measurement technique which uses a radiation source to probe 
materials and generate unique signatures useful for characterizing those materials, is a powerful 
tool for assaying special nuclear material.  Work at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in the area of 
active interrogation, using neutron and photon sources, has been under way for many years to 
develop methods for detecting and quantifying nuclear material for national and homeland security 
research areas.  This research knowledge base is now being extended to address nuclear 
safeguards and process monitoring issues related to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
(GNEP).  As a first step in this area preliminary scoping studies have been performed to 
investigate the usefulness of using active neutron interrogation, with a low-power electronic 
neutron generator, to assay Department of Transportation 6M shipping drums containing uranium 
oxide fuel rodlets from INL’s zero power physics reactor.  Using the paired-counting technique 
during the die-away time period of interrogation, a lower detection limit of approximately 4.2 
grams of enriched uranium (40% 235U) was calculated for a 40 minute measurement using a field 
portable 2.5 MeV neutron source and an array of 16 moderated helium-3 neutron tubes.  Future 
work in this area, including the use of a more powerful neutron source and a better tailored 
detector array, would likely improve this limit to a much lower level.  Further development work 
at INL will explore the applicability of active interrogation in association with the nuclear 
safeguards and process monitoring needs of the advanced GNEP facilities under consideration.  
This work, which will include both analyses and field demonstrations, will be performed in 
collaboration with colleagues at INL and elsewhere that have expertise in nuclear fuel 
reprocessing as well as active interrogation and its use for nuclear material analyses. 
Introduction
 For over 15 years Idaho National Laboratory has supported research and 
development programs focusing on active interrogation to assess objects and containers 
and identify the presence of certain materials including chemical warfare agents, special 
nuclear material, and high explosives.[1,2,3,4,5]  This work has used both neutron and 
photon (bremsstrahlung) radiation sources and has ranged from small portable systems to 
large fixed installations.  Nuclear instrumentation used in these programs has included 
traditional radiation measurement equipment including organic and inorganic 
scintillators, gas filled detectors, and solid-state detectors as well as more advanced 
equipment and techniques including neutron imaging systems, high-speed waveform 
digitization and signal processing, and the development of customized detectors and their 
associated electronics.  With the hope of leveraging this knowledge base a work package 
was recently created within the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) Safeguards 
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Campaign to identify and explore opportunities where active interrogation might be of 
use in support of the GNEP program. 
Active Interrogation and GNEP 
 The GNEP program primarily involves the development of several large-scale 
research and demonstration facilities related to advanced nuclear fuel cycles.  These 
facilities include an advanced reactor, a fuel treatment facility, and a fuel cycle research 
and development facility.  Critical to the success of this program will be the ability to 
demonstrate that effective and affordable solutions can be found to meet the nuclear 
nonproliferation and nuclear safeguards monitoring instrumentation requirements of the 
GNEP fuel reprocessing/recycling facilities.  Challenges in this area will be more 
difficult than previously encountered in fuel reprocessing facilities around the world 
because the advanced fuels to be used in the GNEP fuel cycle will be hybridized mixtures 
of not only uranium and plutonium but also other transuranic elements including 
americium, neptunium, and curium.  The presence of these extra materials in the GNEP 
fuel cycle adds complexity to the safeguards problem because to varying degrees these 
materials possess inherent nuclear attributes similar to plutonium including undergoing 
spontaneous fission, their susceptibility to undergo fission following neutron absorption, 
the emission of high energy alpha particles (which can generate neutrons through (?,n)
reactions), and the emission of both low and higher energy gamma rays.  Historically, 
many of the tools used to safeguard fuel reprocessing facilities have relied on measuring 
one or more of these properties to detect and quantify the presence of plutonium in 
samples.  The presence of interfering sources that also contribute to these signatures 
means that many of the historical tools and techniques used in nuclear safeguards must be 
modified or redesigned to be able to provide plutonium specificity in the presence of Am, 
Np, and Cm.  Active interrogation techniques, which use external radiation sources to 
excite nuclear processes in materials, may help in addressing these challenges because 
inherently weak signatures are amplified under active interrogation and, by using pulsed 
radiation fields, active interrogation can investigate time-correlated signatures which 
passive signature techniques generally cannot. 
 In addition to nuclear safeguards a second important challenge in the next 
generation GNEP facilities will be to extend current industrial process monitoring 
instrumentation and controls technologies for use in high radiation and restricted access 
environments.  In many cases there is a significant overlap between measurements useful 
for nuclear safeguards and measurements useful for monitoring the processes in nuclear 
fuel reprocessing; combining redundant plant measurements useful for both safeguards 
and process monitoring purposes may result in significant savings in labor and hardware 
costs in the GNEP facilities.  Also, by integrating process measurements into the 
safeguards process following the ‘safeguards by design’ philosophy a more integrated 
and more complete assessment of the compliance of a facility with it’s safeguard 
requirements can be ascertained. 
 Today’s industrial nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities at Sellafield, UK, 
Cadarache, France, and Rokkasho, Japan are large and complicated installations; the next 
generation GNEP fuel reprocessing facilities may also be similar in size and complexity 
to these installations.  In order to efficiently operate these plants a large quantity of 
information is needed to control different process streams and to monitor the performance 
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of processes to make sure they are performing in accordance with their design 
specifications.  Monitoring these processes can be both labor and instrumentation 
intensive; however, active interrogation can also play a role in support of process 
monitoring in the future GNEP facilities.  Because active interrogation measurements can 
be performed without contacting material process streams active interrogation is an ideal 
solution for performing on-line monitoring in areas where the process streams are 
hazardous or difficult to contain, and where the consequences of spills and contamination 
are high.  Also, since active interrogation measurements can be made without contacting 
process streams directly, instrumentation maintenance and repair can be preformed 
without the need to break into these process streams or impact plant operations.  Finally, 
since active interrogation measurements and techniques are inherently designed for 
operating in high radiation fields they are particularly well-suited for implementation in 
nuclear fuel reprocessing environments. 
Figure 1  Major steps in the fuel recycling process and areas where active interrogation 
has been used for process monitoring and safeguards measurements. 
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Active Interrogation in Nuclear Process Monitoring and Safeguards 
 Active interrogation as a tool for nuclear safeguards and process monitoring in the 
nuclear fuel cycle has been the subject of many research projects and has been explored 
in nearly every aspect of the reprocessing cycle.  A simple flow sheet showing the major 
steps involved in spent nuclear fuel reprocessing is shown in Figure 1 together with 
examples of where active interrogation has been used for process monitoring and for 
safeguards measurements.  However, active interrogation monitoring techniques have not 
seen widespread application in today’s fuel reprocessing facilities, most likely because 
alternate technologies have been found to achieve the same goals and because active 
techniques are typically more complicated and more expensive than comparable passive 
techniques.  In order to meet the demanding needs of the next generation GNEP 
reprocessing facilities though active interrogation techniques may be the only means of 
providing process monitoring and safeguards answers in some cases.  The following 
paragraphs provide some historical examples of the use of active interrogation in spent 
nuclear fuel reprocessing. 
Irradiated Fuel Assay – A critical safeguards variable that must be known in a fuel 
reprocessing facility is the quantity of plutonium entering the facility in the incoming 
spent nuclear fuel.  This is a difficult parameter to measure and in many instances it is 
determined analytically based upon numerical estimates of fuel burn-up from the 
originating facility where the fuel was used.  In contrast to these numerical estimates 
active interrogation has been explored as a means of directly measuring the special 
nuclear material content of spent nuclear fuel.[6 - 10]  One particularly promising active 
interrogation technique for assaying spent nuclear fuel is the lead slowing-down 
spectrometry (LSDS) technique.  LSDS takes advantage of the fact that there is a 
difference in the fission cross-sections of 235U and 239Pu at 0.3 eV due to a plutonium 
neutron fission resonance. The LSDS technique uses a large assembly of lead to slowly 
moderate a monoenergetic neutron ensemble, generated using an accelerator (either a 
neutron generator or an electron accelerator that produces neutrons via photonuclear 
reactions), from fast to thermal energies.  Neutron detectors embedded within the lead 
assembly are used measure the neutron flux inside the assembly as the ensemble passes 
through the 0.3 eV range.  Quantifying this value and then normalizing it to 
measurements taken when the neutron ensemble reaches the thermal neutron energy 
range (0.025 eV) can then be used to infer the uranium and plutonium contained within 
the assembly.  A measurement precision of better then 5% has been reported with this 
technique for measurements of 30 minutes duration.  
Leached Hulls Analysis – An early step in fuel reprocessing is the mechanical separation 
(shearing) of the incoming fuel assemblies and the dissolution of the spent fuel contained 
within the metal fuel assembly rod pieces.  The shearing process is typically done with a 
large mechanical chopper which cuts the fuel assembly rods into short lengths of a few 
inches or less.  The dissolution process is typically carried out using strong nitric acid (or 
electrochemically).  When the process is complete the dissolved spent fuel/nitric acid 
solution proceeds to the radiochemical separations process.  The metal fuel rod casings, 
or hulls, which do not dissolve in this acid are then dried and melted and cast into waste 
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ingots for permanent disposal.  However, there is a possibility that not all of the spent 
fuel has been removed from these hulls and safeguards measurement must be made to 
quantify the residual plutonium still in the hulls; since the hulls themselves are highly 
radioactive after their residence in a nuclear reactor this is a difficult measurement.  
Typically spent fuel hulls are assayed by small-lot grab sampling of the inventory of 
chopped hulls.  In contrast to this approach, active interrogation techniques have been 
developed to perform complete assays of the entire inventory of leeched hulls.[11 - 14]  
Results at the THORP plant in the UK (Figure 2) have demonstrated this technique to be 
capable of achieving good measurement precisions over a range residual fissile material 
quantities in leached hull.  Also evident in this figure is that a large, well-shielded facility 
is needed to safely handle and process these materials. 
Figure 2  Scale drawing of a BNFL Instruments Ltd. leached hull analyzer installed at 
the THORP reprocessing plant in Sellafield, UK (left), and a plot showing the 
instrument’s measurement linearity and precision for quantifying residual fissile content 
remaining in the hulls (right).[14]
Process Monitoring – In addition to monitoring and assessing plutonium and fissile 
material content entering and exiting a reprocessing facility there is also utility in 
measuring a) the fissile material content in process streams within a reprocessing plant 
and b) the chemistry and material content in support process streams within a 
reprocessing plant.  Process stream information can be used to identify if non-standard 
operating conditions exist within a plant that may be indicative of proliferation activities.  
In addition, process monitoring can also be used to control in-plant activities to increase 
plant efficiency, increase material throughput, and reduce operating costs.  A few trial 
experiments have been reported of using active interrogation for process monitoring.[15 - 
17]  Typically these instruments use neutron sources as the probe radiation and then, for 
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fissile material analysis, use delayed neutron counting to infer fissile material masses.  
These instruments have been shown to be capable of measuring uranium or plutonium 
concentrations of ~10 grams per Liter in just a few minutes with measurement 
uncertainties of ~10%; they have also been used to measure lower fissile concentrations 
with a similar precision but with longer counting times.  
Active Interrogation Safeguards Scoping Experiments at INL 
 Idaho National Laboratory is ideally suited for investigating and demonstrating 
advanced safeguards instrumentation using active interrogation techniques.  In addition to 
existing national and homeland security active interrogation programs mentioned in the 
introduction, and their related test, evaluation and support facilities, the Laboratory also 
hosts a complete set of fuel reprocessing and fabrication facilities within the Materials 
and Fuels Complex (MFC) (Figure 3).  Included in this Complex are hot cells at the Hot
Fuel Examination Facility (HFEF) suited for spent nuclear fuel receipt and 
characterization and spent nuclear fuel disassembly and fuel shearing, hot cells in the 
Fuel Conditioning Facility (FCF) suited for chemical or electrochemical separations of 
fuel from cut fuel pieces, radiochemical or electrochemical separation of spent fuel 
components, and conversion of separated products, and glove boxes at the Fuel
Manufacturing Facility (FMF) suited for fabrication of new fuel.  Additionally, the 
Complex also supports the Special Nuclear Material (SNM) Storage Area and the 
Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT), places where general purpose safeguards 
experiments may be performed using uranium and plutonium. 
Figure 3  The INL Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) 
 As a first step towards developing a safeguards focused active interrogation 
research capability at INL, scoping experiments were performed in December of 2007 to 
investigate a technique for receipt inspections to confirm the presence of SNM in a 
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Department of Transportation (DOT) 6M drum.1  These experiments served a dual role 
within INL’s active interrogation program and were also used to examine interrogation 
techniques useful for shielded SNM detection.  For these experiments three shipping 
drums were used; one contained 30 kg of depleted uranium (DU); one contained 4 kg of 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) (oxide fuel rodlets, 40% enriched 235U), and the third 
contained 8 kg of the same HEU material (see Figure 4).2
Figure 4  The DOT 6M drum used for these experiments and a photo of the HEU fuel 
rodlets.[18]
 The detectors used in these experiments included a  0.5 m2 liquid scintillator array  
and a 2 m2 array of helium-3 filled proportional counters (Figure 5).  The proportional 
counters were located within polyethylene moderators that were encased within cadmium 
and boron to shield the gas tubes against thermal neutrons generated outside of the 
detector assemblies.  The detector arrays were assembled in two sections and placed on 
opposite sides of the 6M drums, as seen in the pictures.  The active interrogation source 
for these experiments was a Thermo Electron MP320 electronic neutron generator (ENG) 
using deuterium which produced a monoenergetic neutron spectrum of 2.5 MeV neutrons 
with an intensity of roughly 1 x 106 neutrons per second.  The 6M drums were positioned 
with their axis of symmetry parallel to the ground.  The neutron generator was roughly 
centered on the top of the drums for active interrogation.  For tests with the liquid 
1 These experiments were performed with researchers from Oak Ridge National Laboratory ORNL).  INL 
collaborators included B. Blackburn, S. Watson, J. Johnson, E. Seabury, D. Norman, K. Haskell, B. 
Bennett, and B. Brush.  ORNL collaborators included P. Hausladen, J. Mihalczo, and S. McConchie. 
2 These fuel rodlets were from INL’s zero power physics reactor (ZPPR). 
HEU fuel rodlets prior 
to loading into the 
DOT 6M drum. 
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scintillator array the generator was pulsed at a rate of 10,000 Hz with a pulse width of 10 
microseconds; with the He-3 array the generator was pulsed at a rate of 300 Hz with a 
pulse width of 166 microseconds.  
Figure 5  The liquid scintillator array (top picture) and helium-3 array (bottom picture) 
used for interrogation of the 6M drums.  The neutron generator can be seen in the bottom 
picture. 
Liquid scintillator detector arrays
DOT 6M Drum
DD neutron 
generator 
3He detectors 
DOT 6M drum 
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 Data was collected and pre-processed for these experiments using ORNL’s 
Nuclear Material Identification System (NMIS) electronics hardware, evaluating single 
counts in each detector, time-correlated pairs of counts between multiple detectors, and 
neutron multiplicity.[19]  Measurement were taken for durations of 15 to 30 minutes.  
From the liquid scintillator array pair-counting data plots are shown in Figure 6.  In these 
plots the abscissa values correspond to the time the first neutron event is detected, 
following a neutron generator pulse, in any particular detector; the time scale for these 
measurements is 0.1 microseconds.  The ordinate values in these plots correspond to the 
relative times or arrival of the first and second neutron pulses in a pair, in units of 0.1 
microseconds, where the time value of 1028 corresponds to a zero difference (i.e., two 
pulses are counted in separate detectors simultaneously).  Pulses (pairs of counts) are 
symmetrically distributed above and below the 1028 line. 
 While the neutron generator is on multiple pairs of pulses are continuously 
recorded at all time separations.  After the generator pulse is over this source of randomly 
correlated neutrons no longer exists and the only correlated source of neutrons remaining 
in the experiment are a) those originating from fission caused as the neutron population in 
the drum thermalizes and produces follow-on fission in the HEU (the die-away region) 
and b) from the decay of beta-delayed fission products that emit neutrons (the delayed 
neutron region), which are not time correlated.  As seen in the figure, the passive 
signature from the drum is very weak.  The active background signature shows a 
processing artifact but otherwise, after the end of the neutron pulse, the correlated pair 
spectrum is essentially empty.  The spectral signature from the 8 kg HEU drum, in 
contrast, shows a very strongly correlated paired neutron signature out until 100 
microseconds and the start of the next pulse.  The measurement of pairs of neutron events 
following irradiation is a very powerful technique for detecting SNM, is resilient to 
random background signatures, and can be insensitive to nearby photon radiation. 
Figure 6  NMIS data with the liquid scintillator array of a) the 6M drum loaded with 8 kg 
of HEU without the external neutron source, b) the array response with the ENG without 
HEU, and c) the array response with 8 kg of HEU and the ENG operating.1
1 Plots courtesy of P. Hausladen, ORNL. 
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of PSD after 
saturation 
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b) c) a) 
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 Similar to the liquid scintillator data, paired neutron counting plots are also shown 
in Figure 7 for data collected with the He-3 detector array.  Rather then detecting fast 
neutrons directly as with the liquid scintillators, these detectors rely on first moderating 
the fast neutrons in the polyethylene shroud that surrounds the He-3 tubes.  As a result of 
this process the time correlations between neutron events in these detectors are broadened 
versus those seen in the liquid scintillators; this can be seen in Figure 7b where the 
correlated neutron pairs following the end of the neutron pulse are spread much wider in 
time.  Despite this broadening though the existence of a time correlated neutron source is 
still clearly evident using the He-3 detector arrays as well.  
Figure 7  NMIS data with the He-3 detector array of a) the array response with the ENG 
without HEU and b) the array response with 8 kg of HEU and the ENG operating.1
 From the helium-3 data further analysis has also been performed to assess the 
relative sensitivity of this technique for detecting and eventually quantifying the HEU in 
the drums; data from this analysis is presented graphically in Figure 8.  The two top plots 
in this figure show the standard die-away neutron signature following the DD ENG pulse 
(left) and a cumulative counts plot starting at 350 microseconds after the NG pulse start 
time (right).  Below these plots are corresponding plots showing the measured signature 
of counting pairs-of-counts in the He-3 array when pairs occur less then 650 
microseconds apart.  Measurement times for collection of this data were approximately 
40 minutes.  The signal from 0 – 350 microseconds is essentially a result of fast neutrons 
from the neutron generator slowing down within the detector’s moderating structure and 
then being counted by the He-3 tubes. Neutrons from 350 – 2000 microseconds are a 
combination of fission neutrons from the test object still being generated as neutrons are 
undergoing moderation in the assembly, and delayed neutrons from the fission product 
beta-delayed neutron emitters (the die-away region).  At times greater then 2000 
microseconds the neutron signature is dominated by the beta delayed neutron emitters 
fission products and the detectors inherent background count rate (the delayed neutron 
region).
1 Plots courtesy of P. Hausladen, ORNL. 
Active Analysis of 
Empty Volume 
Active Analysis of 
8 kg of HEU 
b) a)
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Figure 8  Die-away time spectra and cumulative event spectra (beginning 350 
microseconds after the start of the neutron pulses) from the He-3 array for both single 
count events and paired counting events (events separated by less than 650 microseconds) 
measuring the active background, the 6M Drum signature containing 30 kg DU, and the 
6M Drum signature while containing 8 kg of HEU. 
   Reviewing these plots there is a clear signature that is observable in the die-away 
region from both DU and HEU that is above the background signature.  In the delayed 
neutron region the HEU signature presents a significant change over the background 
signature but it is not nearly as large as that seen during the die-away region.  Taking 
advantage of the inherent background rejection achieved through the use of paired pulse 
counting, as seen in the lower plots of Figure 8, a further improvement in signal-to-noise 
is seen in the die-away of this data versus the single pulse counts.   Simply placing a 
signal requirement of +3? over the background to determine the lower detection limit 
(LDL), the single pulse counting technique would have a LDL of 564 g DU and 20.5 g 
HEU (40% enriched 235U).  The paired pulse counting technique would have a LDL of 
401 g DU and 4.2 g HEU (40% enriched 235U).  These values could be further improved 
through the use of a more intense ENG, or perhaps a deuterium-tritium ENG producing 
14.1 MeV neutrons, or by counting for a longer period.  Also, a custom designed detector 
system and improved irradiation geometry would probably also serve to improve the 
detection efficiency of these techniques.
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 Extending these observations to the GNEP safeguards context it is clear that 
active interrogation could be used to perform SNM material inspections of bulk materials 
including spent fuel hull claddings, solid waste forms, or low-activity waste drums.  
Images of two bulk material forms, a metals waste form and a uranium metal ingot, from 
spent fuel reprocessing activities at INL that might also be analyzed using active 
interrogation are shown in Figure 9.  Extending these preliminary results further, and as 
shown in previously published literature, the technique also has applicability in process 
monitoring to detect and quantify SNM content in future nuclear reprocessing facility 
process streams. 
Figure 9  Photo a) shows a metal waste form from INL’s electrochemical reprocessing 
(pyroprocessing) facility created from melting down spent fuel hull claddings from the 
Experimental Breeder Reactor – II (EBR-II) fast reactor, photo b) shows a uranium ingot 
made from melting and casting reprocessed EBR-II fuel after undergoing electrochemical 
reprocessing.
Future Active Interrogation Safeguards Work at INL
 Future work at INL will proceed towards applying active interrogation technology 
to find measurement solutions for GNEP safeguards challenges.  In particular, work will 
be performed to identify unique measurement problems anticipated in the GNEP facilities 
where active interrogation can be used.  These investigations will be carried out in 
consultation with experts in aqueous and electrochemical reprocessing in order to identify 
unique situations associated with the GNEP fuel cycle (which will incorporate 
transuranic elements in the final fuel forms) that have not been previously encountered in 
other aqueous reprocessing facilities associated with uranium fuel remanufacturing or 
mixed-oxide fuel manufacturing.  The applicability of using active interrogation 
techniques to monitor both radioactive and non-radioactive process streams in advanced 
GNEP facilities will also be investigated.  INL has a long established partnership of 
collaborating with other Department of Energy laboratories and universities in the field of 
active interrogation.  These relationships will be leveraged in support of this work 
including an already existing partnership with local colleagues associated with Idaho 
State University. 
a) b)
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